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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DENNIS P. GLICK,
Petitioner and Appellee,
v.

Priority No. 15

M. TAMARA HOLDEN, Warden
Southpoint Complex
Utah State Prison,

Case No. 940004-CA

Respondent and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal arises from the trial court's grant of Glick's
request for relief in his petition for extraordinary writ, Glick
is an inmate transferred from Arkansas pursuant to the Interstate
Corrections Compact (ICC). He is not challenging his conditions of
confinement, not his conviction or sentence; therefore, this Court
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (g) (Supp.
1993).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Does the ICC require the Utah State Prison to apply

Arkansas' disciplinary, classification, visitation, and grooming
policies when dealing with Glick?

1

2.

Does the order of the United States District Court for

the District of Utah, issued May 19, 1993, dismissing the same
claim raised in the instant petition require this petition's
dismissal on the basis of res judicata?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing the trial court's decision to grant a motion for
summary judgment, this Court views "the facts and all reasonable
inferences in a light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion.11 Neiderhauser Builders and Development Corp. v. Campbell,
824 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah App. 1992).
the

trial

court's

conclusions

However, this Court reviews
of

law

for

correctness.

Neiderhauser, 824 P.2d at 1196.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES
No constitutional provisions or rules appear to be relevant to
this matter. The only relevant statute, Utah Code Ann. § 77-28a-l
(1990), the codification of the ICC, is attached as Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal arises from the trial court's grant of Glick's
motion for summary judgment and the denial of respondent's motion
for summary judgment. After this oral decision, respondent filed
a motion to vacate the order, which the trial court also denied.
The court, however, granted respondent's motion to stay execution
of the judgment pending appeal.

The trial court signed the final

order on November 22, 1993 and respondent filed her Notice of
Appeal on December 22, 1993.
2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Glick initially filed this petition on March 31, 1992.

He

claims that, because he is an inmate transferred from Arkansas
pursuant to the Interstate Corrections Compact

(ICC), Utah is

obligated to use Arkansas' policies and procedures in managing him.
(R. at 2). On July 6, 1992, the trial court dismissed the action
due to Glick's failure to attach documents required by rule 65B,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

(R. at 15). A few months later,

based upon Glick's motion for a new trial, the court vacated the
order of dismissal and ordered respondent to file an answer.

(R.

at 44) .

At the same time, the court appointed Glick pro bono

counsel.

Id.

Respondent answered the petition and, shortly thereafter,
filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the ICC did
not require Utah to apply Arkansas' policies and procedures to
Glick while he was incarcerated at the Utah State Prison.

In the

memorandum supporting summary judgment, respondent also attached a
copy of the contract between Arkansas and Utah specifically giving
Utah disciplinary authority over Glick.

(R. at 71-76).

In

response, Glick also filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging
that the ICC affirmatively required Utah's obeisance to Arkansas
prison regulations.
After a hearing on the motions, the trial court granted
Glick's motion for summary judgment, concluding that under the ICC
Utah acted merely as an agent for Arkansas and, therefore, Utah had
3

to

apply

policies.

Arkansas'

visitation,

grooming,

and

classification

Additionally, the trial court ruled that Utah had to

either: (1) reconvene the disciplinary proceedings to which Glick
had been subjected while at the prison and hold them according to
Arkansas' rules; (2) send the evidence used in the disciplinary
proceedings to Arkansas' officials for a decision; or (3) record or
transcribe the disciplinary hearing and send it to Arkansas'
officials for their concurrence in the result,1

(R. at 288-290).

Within a few days of the court's oral decision but before the
written order was entered, respondent's attorney learned that Glick
had previously filed a complaint in the United States District
Court for the District of Utah claiming, among other things, that
Utah was required to apply Arkansas' policies and procedures.

(R.

at 191; Glick v. Steward, Case No. 93-C-071W, United States
District Court, District of Utah, filed March 30, 1993; Addendum
B).

1

Though not particularly relevant due to the resolution of
this case at the trial court level, it is important to understand
the particular disciplinary violation that immediately led to
Glick's petition. Apparently Glick had destroyed his prison ID
card. The prison mailroom found Glick's photo in an outgoing
letter. Glick admitted that he had cut the photo out of the ID
card, (R. at 33), but he argued that he did not know such conduct
was a violation of prison rules because he was from Arkansas. Id.
The prison disciplinary officer accepted this excuse and
reduced the severity of the violation from a major disciplinary
infraction to a minor, id. Glick actually received no punishment
because he already had paid for a new ID card. Id.
Glick's
conduct also violates Arkansas' disciplinary rules as well as
Utah's and would require a similar disposition even in an Arkansas
prison. (R. at 121-122) .
4

The federal complaint was filed one day before this petition
was filed in the state trial court. Before Glick filed his motion
for a new trial to re-commence this state proceeding, United States
Magistrate

Judge

Alba

had

already

issued

a

Report

and

Recommendation in the federal case dismissing the ICC claim as
frivolous pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1915(d).

(R. at 197). Glick had

received the Report & Recommendation, but never objected to it. On
May 19, 1993, United States District Court Judge David Winder,
after a de novo review, approved the Report and Recommendation, and
dismissed several counts in Glick's complaint.
Addendum C).

(R. at 205-220;

In his order, Judge Winder went through a lengthy

analysis of Arkansas law and the text of the ICC, concluding that
the interstate agreement did not obligate Utah's prison system to
apply Arkansas policies and procedures. This conclusion supported
the respondent's position below.
Upon finding out about the prior federal case, respondent
filed a motion to vacate the court's order pursuant to rule 60(b),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The motion was based not just on

the existence of the prior complaint, but also on Glick's failure
to inform the trial court of either the pending adjudication,
Magistrate

Judge Alba's Report

Winder's order.

and Recommendation,

or Judge

(R. at 185-189). After submission of memoranda by

both parties and oral argument, the trial court denied the motion
to vacate, signed Glick's proposed order, and granted respondent's

5

motion to stay execution of the order pending appeal-

(R. at 292;

Addendum D ) .
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Interstate Corrections Compact (ICC) is an agreement among
various states, including Utah, that facilitates the transfer of an
inmate from one state to another.

The inmate remains subject to

the sentence for which he was imprisoned in his or her home state
but is allowed to spend his time elsewhere, usually either to be
close to family or enjoy programs and opportunities not available
in his or her home state.
The trial court's decision requiring Utah to apply Arkansas'
policies and procedures is incorrect because it misconstrues the
effect of the agency relationship created by the compact and does
not comply with the compact's requirement that transferred inmates
like Glick be treated equally with inmates native to the receiving
state. The trial court's judgment thwarts the purposes of the ICC
by creating actual obstacles to interstate transfer, requiring Utah
to learn and apply not just Arkansas' policies and procedures but,
by logical extension, the policies and procedures of every state
from whom Utah has received an inmate under the ICC.
In the contract between Arkansas and Utah, Arkansas expressly
delegated to this state disciplinary control and authority over
compacted inmates like Glick.

Under the law of agency, which the

trial court stated was the purported basis for its decision, the
agent, in this case Utah, is required to follow the directions of
6

the principal, Arkansas. By directing Utah to maintain discipline
and control over Arkansas' inmates and to refrain from giving them
special privileges, Arkansas has directed Utah to apply the same
policies and procedures on classification, discipline, visitation,
and grooming as Utah does on its own inmates.
Additionally, Glick's petition should have been dismissed due
to the doctrine of res judicata. Glick brought this same issue to
federal court in 1993 and his claim was thoroughly analyzed and
dismissed as frivolous by the federal court.

Under the legal

definition of frivolous pertinent to these cases in federal court,
that dismissal evidenced its opinion that Glick's claim had no
basis in law or fact.

Thus, the federal court action was a

dismissal on the merits of the claim and should bar this case. Any
other disposition encourages litigants to roam from court to court,
searching for a sympathetic judge.

This purpose is precisely the

reason for res judicata and compels application of the doctrine
here.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE ICC DOES NOT IMPOSE ARKANSAS' POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES ON THE UTAH PRISON SYSTEM;
THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY GRANTED
THE REQUESTED RELIEF.

The purpose of the ICC is to develop and execute "programs of
cooperation for the confinement, treatment and rehabilitation of
offenders with the most economical use of human and material
resources."

Utah

Code Ann.

§ 77-28a-l

(1990), Article

Interstate Corrections Compact). (Addendum A) .

I,

To achieve that

purpose, however, the ICC must also facilitate inmate transfers,
or, at least, not create obstacles to them. Article IV of the ICC
requires that, before an inmate is transferred, he must request it
in writing.2

The requirement of inmate consent illustrates that

the underlying rationale for enactment of the ICC was humanitarian:
to allow inmates the opportunity to serve their sentences closer to
family members.

The record establishes that Glick requested a

transfer to the Utah prison system precisely for this reason.

(R.

at 4) . Ultimately then, any court ruling that hinders the transfer
system prejudices an inmate's ability to transfer.
Because it incorrectly interpreted the ICC, the trial court's
order frustrates the goals and purposes of the compact. By logical
extension of the court's reasoning, the prison system is bound to
follow the policies and procedures of forty-nine other state
jurisdictions for each particular compacted inmate. This patchwork
quilt of policies and procedures will create administrative burdens
that

will

inevitably

deter

the

Utah

prison

system

from

participating in the ICC.3
2

The Western Interstate Corrections Compact, an agreement
among the western contiguous states, Hawaii, Alaska, and Guam does
not require inmate consent. Utah Code Ann. § 77-28-1 (1991) .
Otherwise, the language of the two compacts is identical.
3

In practice, if the Utah prison system has accepted an
inmate from another state under the compact, Utah has the option,
which it has exercised in many cases, to send a Utah inmate to that
jurisdiction, based on the inmate's written request. Therefore, if
the trial court's decision becomes the norm, and the Utah prison,
in order to lessen its administrative burdens, starts returning
those transferred inmates, not only the Utah system, but also the
8

Glick takes several discrete sentences from the compact, takes
them out of context, and creates an argument for a position, that,
if followed by Utah courts, would, in all probability, end the
state's participation in the ICC. However compelling and logical
that textual argument may seem, when analyzed in the context of the
ICC and its purposes, the error in the trial court's decision
becomes manifest.
In its oral decision granting Glick's motion for summary
judgment, the trial court stated its opinion that the ICC required
application of Arkansas' rules because it is "reasonably clear and
unambiguous that the receiving state acts in the capacity as an
agent for the sending state."

(R. at 331; Tr. Hearing before Hon.

Kenneth Rigtrup, Glick v. Holden, Case No. 920901737, September 27,
1993, at 29).
Although

Utah

acts

as

an

agent

for

Arkansas

while

incarcerating Glick, the trial court misconstrues the effect of the
agency relationship on Utah's power to apply its prison policies
and procedures while Glick resides here. According to the Second
Restatement of Agency, an agent "is authorized to do . . . what it
is reasonable for him to infer that the principal desires him to do
in the light of the principal's manifestations. . . . "
(Second) of Agency § 33 (1958) .

Restatement

The manifestation of Arkansas'

prisons in the other states with which Utah has contracted will be
disrupted.
Ultimately, the ICC will no longer facilitate
interstate prison transfers and the purposes for which the ICC was
created will be thwarted.
9

desires, as the principal, is best evidenced by the contract
entered into by both states in 1978 to implement the ICC. (Addendum
R).
In terms of agency, the written contract details the agent's,
i.e., Utah's, authority^.and powers over Glick and its relationship
with Arkansas.

According to agency law, Utah is bound to obey

Arkansas' directives. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 14 cmt.
a (1958) ("[T]he agent is subject to a duty not to act contrary to
the principal's directions.").
In the contract, Arkansas directs Utah to "maintain proper
discipline and control" over Arkansas inmates and "to make certain
that they receive no special privileges.
More

important, Arkansas

(R. 80; Addendum E) .

expressly permits

Utah

to

exercise

disciplinary authority over its compacted inmates and subjects
those inmates to Utah law and regulations.
At the same time however, the contract

(R. 82; Addendum E ) .

forbids the Utah prison

from imposing any type of discipline prohibited by Arkansas.4 Id.
Arkansas does not allow corporal punishment, R. at 122, and neither
does Utah, R. at 170.

4

Under principles of statutory construction, this lone
exception to the broad grant of disciplinary authority implies that
there are no other exceptions.
In accordance with the axiom
"expressio unius est expressio alterius" when a contract or statute
contains specific exceptions, it is inferred that the drafter of
the instrument did not intend other exceptions.
Sutherland's
Statutory Construction, § 47.23 (5th ed. 1992).
10

The

trial

court

apparently

assumed

that

the

agency

relationship required Utah to become Arkansas' alter ego, acting
essentially as the western branch of the Arkansas prison system.
Neither the ICC, the contract, nor agency law, allows such a
significant intrusion into a receiving state's correctional system.
Indeed,

this

interpretation

commandment of the ICC:

conflicts

with

a

fundamental

that all inmates be treated equally with

inmates native to the receiving state. Utah Code Ann. § 77-28a-l,
Article IV, Interstate Corrections Compact.

The logic behind the

ICC's injunction that all inmates be treated equally is plain: it
would be administratively unworkable for a prison system to have to
adopt the policies and procedures of another state when it accepted
that state's inmates.5
Glick also bases his argument on language in the ICC regarding
the "legal rights" of the compacted inmate and the obligation that
a hearing required by Arkansas law be held in accordance with that
state's law.

As discussed thoroughly in Judge Winder's order,

these provisions do not compel application of Arkansas' policies
and procedures because Arkansas law does not give inmates, even in
Arkansas prisons, any "legal right" to a particular classification.
(R. at 215) .

Additionally, Arkansas law does not give Glick a

5

If this were required, it leaves numerous questions
unanswered: Would Arkansas' constitution apply when determining
the amount of due process that need be given the inmate? Would
court cases regarding the conditions of confinement in Arkansas
prisons apply to the Utah institution in which Glick is housed?
11

legal right to a particular disciplinary procedure, a specific
number of visitors, or grooming standards.

(R. at 216).

In Strickland v. Dver. 628 F.Supp. 180, 181 (E.D. Ark. 1986),
the federal district court stated that Arkansas law did not protect
an inmate's right to a particular classification. This conclusion
is the same as that contained in Moodv v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78
(1976), which held that the federal constitution did not protect an
inmate's classification.

Thus, Glick has no legal right to the

substantive classification given either by Arkansas authorities or
by Utah authorities.
Neither does Arkansas give Glick a legal right either to a
particular

disciplinary

procedure

or

result

(other

than the

prohibition on types of discipline not allowed in Arkansas).
Arkansas law gives the director of the Department of Corrections
the mandate to develop rules and regulations "for the maintenance
of good order and discipline in the facilities and institutions of
the department, including proceedings for dealing with violations."
Ark. Code Ann. § 12-29-103 (1987). By specifically directing Utah
to apply its own policies and procedures in reference to Glick, the
Arkansas

Department

of

Corrections

has

developed

rules

and

regulations for inmates, like Glick, who are compacted to other
states,

i.e.,

the

disciplinary

policy

and procedure

of the

receiving state.
To interpret the ICC properly, the requirement to treat all
inmates equally must be accorded controlling weight.
12

When looked

at in this fashion, the contractual provisions regarding special
privileges and the exercise of disciplinary authority make sense.
Because the ICC requires equality in treatment, the receiving state
must

apply

its disciplinary,

classification, visitation, and

grooming policies. Otherwise, the compacted inmate is being given
special privileges and the ICC is violated.

The trial court's

order compels that violation.
This conclusion is supported by the only two cases in the
country that have discussed this issue. In Stewart v. McManus, 924
F.2d 138, 141-42 (8th Cir. 1991), the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a Kansas prisoner housed in an Iowa prison
pursuant to the compact was not entitled to application of Kansas'
policies and procedures. As the respondent argued in this matter,
the Stewart court relied both on the ICC's injunction to treat all
prisoners equally and on a contractual provision giving the
receiving

state

compacted inmate.

disciplinary
Id.

control

and

authority

over the

The Iowa Supreme Court reached the same

result in Cranford v. State. 471 N.W.2d 904, 905-906 (Iowa 1991)
and even adopted the Stewart analysis regarding the need for equal
treatment and the contractual provision regarding discipline.
II.

BECAUSE 6LICK HAD RECEIVED AN ADVERSE RULING
ON THE SAME ISSUE PROM FEDERAL COURT, THE
DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA PROHIBITS HIM FROM
RAISING THE SAME ISSUE IN THE INSTANT
LITIGATION.

13

Fundamentally, the doctrine of res judicata bars a person from
constantly

re-litigating

adjudicated.

issues

that

have

previously

been

State v. Sims. 239 Utah Adv. Rep. 60, 61 (Utah, May

31, 1994). As stated in Sims, res judicata applies when there has
been a prior adjudication of a factual issue and the application of
a rule of law. Id. As pointed out to the trial court, Glick made
the same claim, and raised precisely the same issue, in his federal
case before Judge Winder.
Alba and Judge Winder

(R. 191-196).

found that

Both Magistrate Judge

several

counts

in Glick's

complaint were frivolous and should be dismissed pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1915(d).

Ld.

Section 1915 establishes a procedure by

which an indigent person can file a civil or criminal action in
federal court by filing, in good faith, an affidavit stating that
he is unable to pay costs.
To screen out frivolous lawsuits, subsection 1915(d) allows a
court to dismiss complaints sua sponte prior to service of the
complaint upon defendants. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 3245
(1988).

In Neitzke, the Court ruled that to justify dismissal

under this provision, the complaint's failure to state a claim
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is
insufficient.6

Id. at 327.

Instead, subsection 1915(d) created

6

As a result of Nietzke, the legal definitions of
"frivolous" and "failure to state a claim" are independent of each
other though they may overlap in practice. To express the concept
in formulaic terms: all complaints properly dismissed as frivolous
under section 1915(d) would also be subject to dismissal under rule
12(b)(6), but not all complaints subject to rule 12(b)(6) would
14

a more rigorous standard, i.e., that the complaint must lack any
"arguable basis in law or fact." JCd. at 325. When understood in
its proper procedural context, it becomes even more apparent that
the prior federal court decision disposed of the merits of Glick's
claim and found them lacking even an arguable basis in law or fact.
Therefore, Judge Winder's order, issued four months before the
oral argument and decision in this case bars Glick's petition as
res judicata.

Glick attempts to distinguish the two cases by

stating that Judge Winder's decision concerned only whether the
purported violation of the ICC created a cause of action under 42
U.S.C.

§

1983

and

that

this

case

instead

concerned

the

interpretation of the ICC without regard to federal civil rights
law.
Although it is true that Judge Winder ultimately focused on
Glick's inability to successfully plead a cause of action under §
1983, in doing so, he also concluded that the ICC did not impose
Arkansas' policies and procedures on Utah.

(R. at 211-216).

Indeed, the federal court specifically avoided resolving the basic
question of whether a violation of the ICC can result in a civil
rights action by concluding instead that "the ICC does not grant
prisoners a right to maintain a particular prisoner classification

properly be subject to dismissal as frivolous. In effect, this
ruling increases the number of section 1915 actions that are served
and later resolved at the motion to dismiss stage.
15

or

to

have

ADOC

[Arkansas]

officials

conduct

violations of UDOC [Utah] disciplinary process."

hearings

for

(R. 212).7

By the time the trial court had ordered the state to respond
to Glick's petition, he already had received an adverse ruling from
the federal court,

Glick failed to object to Magistrate Judge

Alba's Report and Recommendation and also did not appeal Judge
Winder's order.

The issue was adjudicated and decided and res

judicata prevents Glick from trying for a different ruling on the
same issue in another court.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, respondent respectfully requests
that this Court reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand
the case with instructions that the trial court enter summary
judgment in favor of respondent.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS ?^/ ^dav of June 1994.
JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General
James H. Beadles
Assistant Attorney General

7

By resolving the case in this fashion, the federal court
successfully avoided having to decide whether Congress has
transformed the ICC into federal law, which would allow a civil
rights action to be brought for its violation. (R. at 211-212).
The federal courts of appeal have split on this issue. Id.
16
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

CHAPTER 28a
INTERSTATE CORRECTIONS COMPACT
Section
77-28a-l.
Compact entered into law - Text of compact.
77-28a-2.
Department of Corrections - Authority to transfer
inmates.
77-28a-3.
Duties and powers of courts, departments, agencies
and officers in enforcing and effecting compact.
77-28a-4.
State Board of Pardons - Authority to hold hearings.
77-28a-5.
Governor - Power to enter into contracts.
77-28a-l. Compact entered into law - Text of compact.
The interstate compact on corrections as contained herein is
enacted into law and entered into on behalf of this state with any
and
all
other
states
legally
joining
therein
in
a
form
substantially as follows:
INTERSTATE CORRECTIONS COMPACT
ARTICLE I
PURPOSE AND POLICY
The party states, desiring by common action to fully utilize
and improve their institutional facilities and provide adequate
programs for the confinement, treatment and rehabilitation of
various types of offenders, declare that it is the policy of each
of the party states to provide such facilities and programs on a
basis of co-operation with one another, thereby serving the best
interests of such offenders and of society and effecting economies
in capital expenditures and operational costs. The purpose of this
Compact is to provide for the mutual development and execution of
such programs of co-operation for the confinement, treatment and
rehabilitation of offenders with the most economical use of human
and material resources.
ARTICLE II
DEFINITIONS
As used in this Compact, unless the context clearly requires
otherwise:
(a) "State" means a state of the United States, the United
States of America, a Territory or possession of the United States,
the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico;
(b) "Sending state" means a state party to this Compact in
which conviction or court commitment was had;
(c) "Receiving state" means a state party to this Compact to
which an inmate is sent for confinement other than a state in which

(d) "Inmate" means a male or female offender who is
committed, under sentence to or confined in a penal or correctional
institution;
(e) "Institution" means any penal or correctional facility,
including but not limited to a facility for the mentally ill or
mentally defective, in which inmates as defined in (d) above may
lawfully be confined.
ARTICLE III
CONTRACTS
(a) Each party state may make one or more contracts with any
one or more of the other party states for the confinement of
inmates on behalf of a sending state in institutions situated
within receiving states. Any such contract shall provide for:
(1) Its duration;
(2) Payments to be made to the receiving state by the sending
state for inmate maintenance, extraordinary medical and dental
expenses, and any participation in or receipt by inmates of
rehabilative or correctional services, facilities, programs or
treatment not reasonably included as part of normal maintenance;
(3) Participation in programs of inmate employment, if any,
the disposition or crediting of any payments received by inmates on
account thereof, and the crediting of proceeds from or disposal of
any products resulting therefrom;
(4) Delivery and retaking of inmates;
(5) Such other matters as may be necessary and appropriate to
fix the obligations, responsibilities and rights of the sending and
receiving states.
(b) The terms and provisions of this Compact shall be a part
of any contract entered into by the authority of or pursuant
thereto, and nothing in any such contract shall be inconsistent
therewith.
ARTICLE IV
PROCEDURES AND RIGHTS
(a) Whenever the duly constituted authorities in a state party
to this Compact, and which has entered into a contract pursuant to
Article III, shall decide that confinement in, or transfer of an
inmate to, an institution within the territory of another party
state is necessary or desirable in order to provide adequate
quarters and care of an appropriate program of rehabilitation or
treatment, said officials may direct that the confinement be within
an institution with the territory of said other party state, the
receiving state to act in that regard solely as agent for the
sending state.
(b)
The appropriate officials of any state party to this
Compact shall have access, at all reasonable times, to any
institution in which it has a contractual right to confine inmates
for the purpose of inspecting the facilities thereof and visiting

2

such of its inmates as may be confined in the institution*
(c) Inmates confined in an institution pursuant to the terms
of this Compact shall at all times be subject to the jurisdiction
of the sending state and may at any time be removed therefrom for
transfer to a prison or other institution within the sending state,
for transfer to another institution in which the sending state may
have a contractual or other right to confine inmates, for release
on probation or parole, for discharge, or for any other purpose
permitted by the laws of the sending state; provided, that the
sending state shall continue to be obligated to such payments as
may be required pursuant to the terms of any contract entered into
under the terms of Article III.
(d) Each receiving state shall provide regular reports to each
sending state on the inmates of that sending state in institutions
pursuant to this Compact including a conduct record of each inmate
and certify said record to the official designated by the sending
state, in order that each inmate may have official review of his or
her record in determining and altering the disposition of said
inmate in accordance with the law which may obtain in the sending
state and in order that the same may be a source of information for
the sending state.
(e) All inmates who may be confined in an institution pursuant
to the provisions of this Compact shall be treated in a reasonable
and humane manner and shall be treated equally with such similar
inmates of the receiving state as may be confined in the same
institution. The fact of confinement in a receiving state shall not
deprive any inmate so confined of any legal rights which said
inmate would have had if confined in an appropriate institution of
the sending state.
(f)
Any hearing or hearings to which an inmate confined
pursuant to this Compact may be entitled by the laws of the sending
state may be had before the appropriate authorities of the sending
state, or of the receiving state, if authorized by the sending
state. The receiving state shall provide adequate facilities for
such hearings as may be conducted by the appropriate officials of
a sending state. In the event such hearing or hearings are had
before officials of the receiving state, the governing law shall be
that of the sending state and a record of the hearing or hearings
as prescribed by the sending state shall be made. Said record
together with any recommendations of the hearing officials shall be
transmitted forthwith to the official or officials before whom the
hearing would have been had if it had taken place in the sending
state. In any and all proceedings had pursuant to the provisions of
this subdivision, the officials of the receiving state shall act
solely as agents of the sending state and no final determination
shall be made in any matter except by the appropriate officials of
the sending state.
(g)
Any inmate confined pursuant to this Compact shall be
released within the territory of the sending state unless the
inmate, and the sending and receiving states, shall agree upon
release in some other place. The sending state shall bear the cost
«

of such return to its territory.
(h) Any inmate confined pursuant to the terms of this Compact
shall have any and all rights to participate in and derive any
benefits or incur or be relieved of any obligations or have such
obligations modified or his status changed on account of any action
or proceeding in which he could have participated if confined in
any appropriate institution of the sending state located within
such state.
(i) The parent, guardian, trustee, or other person or persons
entitled under the laws of the sending state to act for, advise, or
otherwise function with respect to any inmate shall not be deprived
of or restricted in his. exercise of any powers in respect of any
inmate confined pursuant to the terms of this Compact.
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ARTICLE V
ACTS NOT REVIEWABLE IN RECEIVING STATE: EXTRADITION
(a) Any decision of the sending state in respect of any matter
over which it retains jurisdiction pursuant to this Compact shall
be conclusive upon and not reviewable within the receiving state,
but if at the time the sending state seeks to remove an inmate from
an institution in the receiving state there is pending against the
inmate within such state any criminal charge or if the inmate is
formally accused of having committed within such state a criminal
offense, the inmate shall not be returned without the consent of
the receiving state until discharged from prosecution or other form
of proceeding, imprisonment or detention for such offense. The duly
accredited officers of the sending state shall be permitted to
transport inmates pursuant to this Compact through any and all
states party to this Compact without interference.
(b) An inmate who escapes from an institution in which he is
confined pursuant to this Compact shall be deemed a fugitive from
the sending state and from the state in which the institution is
situated. In the case of an escape to a jurisdiction other than the
sending or receiving state, the responsibility for institution of
extradition or rendition proceedings shall be that of the sending
state, but nothing contained herein shall be construed to prevent
or affect the activities of officers and agencies of any
jurisdiction directed toward the apprehension and return of an
escapee.
ARTICLE VI
FEDERAL AID
Any state party to this Compact may accept federal aid for use
in connection with any institution or program, the use of which is
or may be affected by this Compact or any contract pursuant hereto
and any inmate in a receiving state pursuant to this Compact may
participate in any such federally aided program or activity for
which the sending and receiving states have made contractual
provision; provided, that if such program or activity is not part
of the customary correctional regimen the express consent of the
appropriate official of the sending state shall be required
therefor.
ARTICLE VII
ENTRY INTO FORCE
This Compact shall enter into force and become effective and
binding upon the states so acting when it has been enacted into law
by any two states. Thereafter, this Compact shall enter into force
and become effective and binding as to any other of said states
upon similar action by such state.
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ARTICLE VIII
WITHDRAWAL AND TERMINATION
This Compact shall continue in force and remain binding upon a
party state until it shall have enacted a statute repealing the
same and providing for the sending of formal written notice of
withdrawal from the Compact to the appropriate officials of all
other party states. An actual withdrawal shall not take effect
until one year after the notices provided in said statute have been
sent. Such withdrawal shall not relieve the withdrawing state from
its obligations assumed hereunder prior to the effective date of
withdrawal. Before the effective date of withdrawal, a withdrawing
state shall remove to its territory, at its own expense, such
inmates as it may have confined pursuant to the provisions of this
Compact.
ARTICLE IX
OTHER ARRANGEMENTS UNAFFECTED
Nothing contained in this Compact shall be construed to
abrogate or impair any agreement or other arrangement which a party
state may have with a non-party state for the confinement,
rehabilitation or treatment of inmates nor to repeal any other laws
of a party state authorizing the making of co-operative
institutional arrangements.
ARTICLE X
CONSTRUCTION AND SEVERABILITY
The provisions of this Compact shall be liberally construed and
shall be severable. If any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of
this Compact is declared to be contrary to the constitution of any
participating state or of the United States or the applicability
thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance is held
invalid, the validity of the remainder of this Compact and the
applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or
circumstance shall not be affected thereby. If this Compact shall
be held contrary to the constitution of any state participating
therein, the Compact shall remain in full force and effect as to
the remaining states and in full force and effect as to the state
affected as to all severable matters.
ARTICLE XI
An inmate must request a transfer in writing before such a
transfer can be made pursuant to Article IV.
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ADDENDUM B

Dennis P. Glick
U.S.P. #21016, (A.D.C. #86895)
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\5tah S t a t e P r i s o n , Oquirrh 111
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL PlSTRICT
IN AND TOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Petitioner

Dennis P. Glick

c». ».. Z?/?f/?/7l7

Vs.

M. Tamara Holden, Warden
Southpoint Complex ,
Ltah State Prison

CU

£i£E KEKHEffl M ® L « „ t

Petition For Writ Of Mandamus
Comes the Petitioner, Dennis P. Glick, to petition this
court for a writ of mandamus, pursuant to Rule fc5B(b) of the
Ltah Rules of Civil Procedure, with jurisdiction pursuant to
Utah Judicial Code, Sec. 78-35-9. For his cause of action,
Petitioner states:
1. Petitioner is in custody of the Utah State Prison, by the
Respondent, M. Tamara Holden, Warden of the Southpoint Complex,
P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020, pursuant to the Interstate
Corrections Compact, as of October 21, 1991, from the Arkansas
Department of Correction

(A.D.C.).

2. Upon arrival at the Utah State Prison, and completion of
classification, Petitioner was assessed under the Utah Prison/
Parole time matrix system, a total security score of 26 points,
classifying him C (security score) 3 (custody level) K

(behavior

classification) by classification review officer Scott Carver,
on November 2 5 , 1991.
n r r, P 9

3. On November 29, 1991, Petitioner submitted a classification
challenge form. This was responded to by Classification Coordinator
Colleen Gabbitas, on December 6f 1991, advising Petitioner that
he should not challenge until he receives his copy of the
assessment. Upon receiving the assissment, Petitioner resubmitted
his classification challenge to lis . Gabbitas, with a copy
indicated being forwarded to Respondent Holden, dated December 26,
1991. Therein, Petitioner cited pertinent parts of the Utah Code
on Interstate Corrections Compact, indicating that he shoold be
classified in Utah with the equivalency of his A.D.C. classification,
with Utah Level 5, road crew worker. Petitioner was a class-one
trustee working outside the prison compound prior to his transfer
to Utah.
A. Petitioner again corresponded with Respondent Holden on
January 13, 1992. Therein, making mention of the 12-26-91
classification challenge, and seeking Level 5, the equivalency
of his Arkansas status. The second correspondence was responded
to by Management Processes Coordinator Margaret Peterson, dated
January 15, 1992, stating that while Petitioner is in the custody
of the Utah State Department of Correction, he will be managed
according to Utah policy and procedure.
5. On January 23, 1992, Petitioner received the return of two
Utah Correctional Industries Inmate Application For Work forms,
which were rejected on that date. The first noting that Petitioner
must be Level 4, for the Meat Processing (job #91-105). The second
noting that Petitioner must be Level 5, for the road crew worker

C00C3

(job #92-001)• The latter being the work equivalent to Petitioner's
Arkansas prison job assignment.
6. Petitioner vas informed by Captain John Powers and the unit
caseworker, Larry Chen, during separate interviews, that Petitioner
cannot be reassessed for a higher level status, until he has a
parole date. Petitioner is serving a term of life plus 40 years
and subject by Arkansas law to appear before an executive clemency
committee in Arkansas* The Arkansas jurisdiction over Petitioner's
incarceration was confirmed by the State of Utah Board of Pardon,
in a letter dated December 5, 1991. A special attention hearing
was held by the Utah Board of Pardons, noting that the notification
letter to Petitioner, indicationg a parole hearing date for October
1994, was sent in error.
7. Petitioner transferred to Utah to receive visitation, which
he was unable to receive in Arkansas. However, Petitioner has
several non-related female visitors approved by Arkansas prison
officials. Since being in the Utah State Prison, Petitioner
received two notification of result, or information, dated November
2, 1991, and November 27, 1991, from Visiting Officer J. Cambell
and Visiting Officer T. E. P., respectively, stating that Petitioner
is allowed only one adult female not of immediate family on his
visiting list. Respondent Holden vas made aware of this by letter,
dated November 19, 1991, from Petitioner.
8. On January 7f 1992, Petitioner received a major disciplinary,
in which a personal letter vith a photo of Petitioner, sealed in
an addressed shamp-envelope, and mailed, vas confiscated by the
•3-

mail unit. Petitioner vas charged with B-2-E, deliberate damage
of state property, as charged by Officer Kerry Galetka (case ii
3920-0218). A hearing vas held on February 20f 1992. Petitioner
stated that he vas an interstate compact inmate and subject to
the jurisdiction of Arkansas for final determination. Petitioner
vas found guilty and the action taken vas reduced to a minor
disciplinary, B-4-C, accidental destruction or damage of state
property. No resitution vas ordered, as Petitioner had already
purchased a new l.D. card prior to the notification of the
pending disciplinary action. Appeal of the disciplinary vas taken
on February 28, 1992, seeking that the disciplinary be expunged
from his institutional record, since proper procedure vas not
followed. No result of that action as of the date of this action.
9. On February 14, 1992, Petitioner corresponded \:ith the mail
unit officer, Kerry Galetha, seeking the return of his letter and
stamp envelope taken as evidence for the 1-7*92 disciplinary. The
letter to officer Galetka vas returned to Petitioner, the same
date, stating that he must contact the evidence officer, Kay
Sorenson, to retrieve the letter. Petitioner contacted Officer
Sorenson by letter, dated February 19, 1992, seeking the return
of the letter and envelope. To this date, Petitioner have not
retrieved his property.
RELIEF SOUGHT
10. Petitioner seeks Level 5 and job opportunity equivalent
to that assign to him in Arkansas, or other job opportunity that
-4-

Petitioner nay seek.
11. Petitioner seeks relief from the Utah matrix system, in that
the point assissment not apply to him*
12. Petitioner seeks approval of all visitors that have been
and vould be approved by Arkansas prison officials, regardless
of sex orientation.
13. Petitioner seeks the 1*7-92 disciplinary be expunged from
his institutional record, and the return £«£ his letter and stamp
envelope.
14. Petitioner seeks all reghts to participate in and derive
any benefits or incur or be relieved of any obligations or have
such obligations modified or his status changed on account of any
action or proceeding in vhich he could have participated if
confined in any appropriate institution of the sending state
(Arkansas) located vithin the state of Utah.
15. Any other proper and just relief, including cost and damages
Petitioner may be entitled to by this Court in the interest of
justice.
Respectfully submitted,
Dinnis P. G^ick
VERIFICATION
I, Dennis P. Glick, being first duly sworn under oath
verify the foregoing Petition For Writ Of Mandamus, to be true
and correct, and state the same under penalty of perjury (28 U.S.C.
Sec. 1746) on this ;ty^- day of h*A?u
1992.

/L~s. Y.JU.
Dennis P. G^icK
-5-
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAR'.:f
CENTRAL DIVISION
DENNIS P. GLICK
Plaintiff,
-vs-

HEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER AFFIRMING THE
MAGISTRATE'S REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION

JAMES STEWARD, et. al.,
Defendant.

Civil No:

93-C-71W

Plaintiff, Dennis P. Glick ("Glick") is an inmate
incarcerated in the Utah Department of Corrections, Iron
County/Utah State Correctional Facility in Cedar City, Utah
("Cedar City Facility").

Glick filed a Complaint on January 22,

1993, alleging a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act of
1871, 42 U.S.C. S 1983. At the same time, Glick submitted a
motion to proceed in forma pauperis, together with supporting
affidavits regarding his financial condition.
Shortly thereafter, this court referred the case to
United States Magistrate Judge Samuel Alba pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
S 636. On January 28, 1993, Judge Alba issued a Memorandum &
Order granting Click's motion to proceed in forma pauperis, but
directing Click to file an amended complaint that conformed to an
attached appendix—Directions for Filing Amended Complaint—by

February 16, 1993.
On February 16, 1993, Click filed an Amended Complaint
against defendants James Stewart ("Stewart"}, Lee Hulet
("Hulet"), Gary Gunter ("Gunter"), Margaret Peterson
("Peterson"), and an unidentified inmate discipline hearings
officer ("Unidentified Officer").

Stewart is the Director of the

Inmate Placement Program of the Cedar City Facility, Hulet is an
Inmate Discipline Hearings Officer at the Cedar City Facility,
and Gunter is a Correctional Officer at the Cedar City Facility.
Peterson is the Management Processes Coordinator of the of the
Utah Department of Correction ("UDOC").

The unidentified Inmate

Discipline Hearings Officer is connected with the Utah State
Prison in Draper, Utah ("Draper Facility").
Click alleges that he is a prisoner transferred to Utah
for incarceration at his request from the Arkansas Department of
Corrections ("ADOC") pursuant to the Interstate Corrections
Compact ("ICC").

Am. Compl. at 1.

He was initially transferred

to the Draper Facility, and subsequently was moved to the Cedar
City Facility.

!£,. at 1-2.

Gllck alleges the defendants violated his civil rights
by denying him due process and equal protection of lav as
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the United States
2

Constitution and by .subjecting him to cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the eighth amendment to the United
States Constitution.

Glick's due process and equal protection

claims arise out of alleged violations of the provisions of the
ICC and are detailed in counts 1, 2, 6, 7, and 10 of the Amended
Complaint.

Glick's eighth amendment claims arise out of his

incarceration in a double-occupancy cell (Counts 3 and 5), an
alleged deprivation of food for three days (Count 4), an alleged
unadjudicated punishment (Count 8), and an offensive statement
allegedly made during a strip search (Count 9 ) .
On March 30, 1993, Judge Alba issued a Report &
Recommendation ("R&R") dismissing counts 1-3, and 5-10 of the
Amended Complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. S 1915(d).
2.

R&R at

The R&R does not recommend dismissal of count 4, however, and

would allow Glick to pursue this claim.
This court now has made a ££ novo review of the factual
and legal issues in the Report and Recommendation and, in fact,
of the entire record.

Based on this review, and consistent with

this Memorandum Decision and Order, the court affirms the R&R as
to counts 1-2, A, and €-10 of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.

PISCVSSIPN
A district court may dismiss a case under 28 U.S.C.
3

S 1915(d) if it is "satisfied that the action is frivolous or
malicious."

28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(d) (West 1966).

A complaint is

frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in lav or fact.

Neitzke

v. Williams. 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1987); w » n v. Bellmen. 935 F.2d
1106, 1109 (10th Cir. 1991).
A.

DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS
Glick objects to the dismissal of his due process and

equal protection claims because, he claims, the ICC preserves for
transferred inmates certain "rights" of which he was deprived.
Objections to Magistrate's R&R at 1-5 (hereinafter "Objections")
Counts 1, 6, and 10 of the Amended Complaint allege that upon
transfer from Utah to Arkansas, Click was assigned a prisoner
classification that was more restrictive than the classification
he enjoyed while in Arkansas.

Am. Compl. at 1-2, 4, 5-7.

Counts

2 and 7 allege Glick was the subject of two disciplinary
hearings, one at the Draper facility and one at the Cedar City
Facility, that were conducted solely by UDOC officials,
2, 4, 6-7.

id. at

Glick claims he is entitled under the ZCC to receive

a prisoner classification in Utah that is equivalent to his
Arkansas prisoner classification and to have ADOC officials
adjudicate any disciplinary hearings of which he is the subject.
Objections at 3-5.

Click's claims with regard to these counts
4

are frivolous, however, because, even assuming the ICC preserves
for transferred inmates rights granted by the sending state and
that the deprivation of those rights requires due process,
Arkansas law does not grant the "rights" of which Glick was
allegedly deprived.1
The ICC was enacted into law by the Utah legislature in
1982 and codified at Utah Code Annotated sections 77-28a-l.

See

Interstate Corrections Compact Amendments, ch. 38, S I , 1982 Utah
Laws 165. Arkansas also has adopted the ICC.
SS 12-49-101 to -103 (Michie 1982).2

See Ark. Code Ann.

The ICC recites the desire

of the party states "to fully utili2e and improve institutional
facilities and provide adequate programs for the confinement,

1

Glick makes no allegations that would support an equal
protection claim. The claims at issue do not involve a suspect
class or a fundamental right. See Plvler v. Dog. 457 U.S. 202,
216-17 (1982). Prisoners do not constitute a suspect class,
Ruark v. Solano. 928 F.2d 947, 949 (10th Cir. 1991), and, as
discussed in more detail below, neither the United States
Constitution or Arkansas law create a right to a particular
prisoner classification or to have hearings for disciplinary
violations that occurred in Utah conducted by officials of
Arkansas. Moreover, at least with regard to counts 1, 2, 6, 7,
and 10 of the Amended Complaint, Glick complains not that he was
treated unequally by Utah officials with any specified group, but
rather that he was treated equally with other prisoners
incarcerated in Utah prisons.
3

Subsequent citations to the ICC will be to the Utah code
Annotated.
5

treatment and rehabilitation of various types of offenders."
Utah Code Ann. S 77-28a-l, Art. I (1990).

In addition, the ice

provides that "it is the policy of each of the party states to
provide such facilities and programs on a basis of co-operation
with one another, thereby serving the best interests of such
offenders and of society and effecting economies in capital
expenditures and operational costs.**
provides:

id.

Furthermore, the ICC

"The purpose of this Compact is to provide for the

mutual development and execution of such programs of co-operation
for the confinement, treatment and rehabilitation of offenders
with the most economical use of human and material resources.**
Id.

in furtherance of this purpose, the ICC authorizes the party

states to enter into contracts with each other to provide for the
confinement of inmates in the receiving state on the behalf of
the sending state,

id. Art. III.

The threshold question is whether a violation of the
ICC may give rise to a cause of action under 42 U.8.C.A. 5 1983.
In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, a
plaintiff must allege that a person, acting under color of state
lav, has deprived him of a constitutionally or federally
protected right.
(1982).

Luaar v. Edmonton Oil Co.. 457 U.S. 922, 930

A prisoner has no constitutional right to receive a
particular security classification.
78, 87 n.9 (1976).

Moody v. Paooet. 429 U.S.

Similarly, so long as the minimum

constitutional due process protections appropriate to a prison
disciplinary hearing are afforded, §£& Wolff v. McDonnell. 418
U.S. 539, 564-70 (1974), a prisoner has no constitutional right
to have disciplinary hearings conducted by corrections officials
of the transferring state rather than those of the incarcerating
state.
Even if no federal constitutional right is implicated,
a plaintiff may assert a claim for relief under section 1983 if
he is denied, without due process of lav, "liberty interests"
created by state lav.

Kentucky Deot. of Corrections v. Thompson.

490 U.S. 454, 461 (1989).

The ZCC may work in tandem with other

provisions of Arkansas state lav to create certain liberty
interests, the deprival of which requires due process.9
1

Although the ZCC is facially a matter of state lav, it
arguably was "transformed" into federal law under the Compact
Clause of the United States Constitution (the "Compact Clause"),
U.S. CONST, art. I, S 10, cl. 3, by virtue of Congress's passage
of the Crime Control Consent Act of 1934 (the "Consent Act").
See 4. U.S.C.A. S 112 (West 1985); £ L Cuvler v. Ad»Ffff 449 U.S.
433 (1981) (holding Interstate Agreement on Detainers was
transformed into federal law by virtue of Congress's passage of
the Consent Act). If the ICC was so transformed, a denial of any
rights granted in the ICC would be a violation of federal law
7

Article IV of the ICC is entitled "Procedures and
Rights."

Utah Code Ann. S 77-28a-l, Art. IV (1990).

Under

article IV, the receiving state acts "solely as the agent for the
sending state," lflj. Art. IV.(a), and the transferred inmates
remain subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state. Iflj.
Art. IV. (c).

In its capacity as agent for the sending state, the

receiving state is required by subsection (d) to provide regular
reports to the sending state of the inmates transferred to the
receiving state by the sending state "in order that each inmate
may have official review of his or her record in determining and
altering the disposition of said inmate in accordance with the

sufficient to give rise to a civil rights action under 42
U.S.C.A. S 1983. Only four courts have reached the issue in
published opinions, and they are split 2-2. On the one hand,
Chief Judge Donald E. O'Brien of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa in Cameron v. Mills. 645 F.
Supp. 1119 (S.D. Iowa 1986) (implicitly overruled by Stewart v.
gc£ajQU£, 924 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1991)) and the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts in Opinion of the Justices to the Senate.
184 K.E.2d 353 (Mass. 1962), both held that Congress had
consented to the ICC by passing the Consent Act. On the other
hand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
in Stewart v. McManus. sjjpxa, and the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Washington in Griffin v.
Blodoett. 1993 WL 112093 (E.D. Wash. 1993), held that the ICC was
not within the scope of the Consent Act. The court need not
resolve this issue, however, because, as explained below, the ICC
does not grant prisoners a right to maintain a particular
prisoner classification or to have ADOC officials conduct
hearings for violations of UDOC disciplinary rules.
•

lav which may obtain in the sending state and in order that the
same may be a source of information for the sending state." Id.
Art. IV.(d).
Subsections (e) and (h) of article IV contain broad
language preserving for transferred inmates rights to which they
would be entitled if they were incarcerated in the sending state.
Specifically, subsection (e) provides:
All inmates who may be confined in an institution
pursuant to the provision of this Compact shall be
treated in a reasonable and humane manner and shall be
treated equally with such similar inmates of the
receiving state as may be confined in the same
institution. The fact of confinement in a receiving
state shall not deprive any inmate so confined of any
legal rights which said inmate would have had if
confined in an appropriate institution of the sending
state.
id. Art, TV.(e).

Subsection (h) provides:

Any inmate confined pursuant to the terms of this
Compact shall have any and all rights to participate in
and derive any benefits or incur or be relieved of any
obligations or have such obligations modified or his
status changed on account of any action or proceeding
in which he could have participated if confined in any
appropriate institution of the sending state located
within such state.
24,. Art. IV. (h).
In addition, subsection (f) provides:
Any hearing or hearings to which an inmate confined
pursuant to this Compact may be entitled by the laws of
the sending state may be had before the appropriate
9

authorities of the sending state, or of the receiving
state, if authorized by the sending state. The
receiving state shall provide adequate facilities for
such hearings as nay be conducted by the appropriate
officials of a sending state, In the event such
hearing or hearings are had before officials of the
receiving state, the governing law shall be that of the
sending state and a record of the hearing or hearings
as prescribed by the sending state shall be nade. said
record together with any recommendations of the hearing
officials shall be transmitted forthwith to the
official or officials before whom the hearing would
have been had if it had taken place in the sending
state. In any and all proceedings held pursuant to the
provisions of this subdivision, the officials of the
receiving state shall act solely as agents of the
sending state and no final determination shall be nade
in any natter except by the appropriate officials of
the sending state.
14,. Art. IV. (f).
With regard to Glick's prisoner classification claims
in counts 1, 6, and 10, the ICC itself does not grant a
transferred innate the right to receive the sane classification
in the receiving state that he received in the sending state.
However, because article IV. (a) of tha ICC preserves all "legal
rights" tha transferred innate would have had if ha ware confined
in an appropriate institution of tha sanding state, Utah Code
Ann. S 77-2Sa-l, Art. IV (1990); Ark. Coda § 12-49-102, Art. IV,
it is necessary to determine whether Arkansas statutes or
regulations grant an inmate a "legal right" to racaiva a
particular classification.
10

A review of the relevant statutes, regulations, and
caselaw demonstrates that an innate has no legal right to a
particular classification under Arkansas law.

In Ham* v-

Lockhart. 980 F.2d 734 (8th Cir. 1992) (unpublished decision)
(text in Westlaw), the United States Court ct Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit held that "Arkansas law commits prisoner
classification to the discretion of prison officials, Ark. Code
Ann, S 12-29-202(e) (Michie Supp. 1991), and does not protect an
inmate's right to any particular classification or raise due
process concerns.**

Id. (Westlaw at p.7).

See also Strickland v.

Dver. 628 F. Supp. 180, 181 (E.D. Ark. 1986) (Arkansas law does
not protect an inmate's right to any particular classification).
Therefore, Click's claims in counts ' 6, and •' are frivolous
and are dismissed.
Glick's claims in counts 2 and 7 of the Amended
Complaint must likewise fail.

Glick bases his claims in counts 2

and 7 on Article IV, subsection (f) of the ICC.

Objections at 3.

Article IV, subsection (f) only applies, however, to hearings **to
which an innate confined pursuant to this Compact may be entitled
by the laws of the sending state.**
Art. IV(f) (1990).

Utah Code Ann. S 77-28a-l,

The court's review of the Arkansas statutes

and of the ADOC's regulations reveal no right to a hearing by
11

ADOC officials for violations of Utah disciplinary rules.
The court finds it significant that Glick does not
allege that he was denied any substantive rights or protections
accorded him by Arkansas statutes or ADOC regulations. He has
not alleged that he received a type or amount of punishment
prohibited by Arkansas lav, that he has been punished for an
activity protected by Arkansas lav, or that he vas denied
specific due process rights granted him by Arkansas lav.

St
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Glick objects to the dismissal of his eighth amendment

claims contained in counts 3 and 5.

Objections at 3-4.

Count 3

alleges that after transfer to the Cedar City Facility, Glick
submitted a request for single-cell occupancy to the Program
Specialist, James Kanvill, which vas refused.

Am. Compl. at 2.

Thereafter, Glick alleges, he vas told by an unidentified officer
to move from a single-man cell to a double-man cell.

id. at 2-3.

Then, according to Glick, the day following the move, Glick
"explained" the stress problem to an unidentified Sergeant. As a
result of the "explanation," Glick alleges, he vas moved to a
single-man punitive cell and informed that he vas on temporary
lockdovn pending disciplinary action. lit. at 3.

Similar to the

third cause of action, the fifth cause of action alleges that
12

following the lockdown, Click was once again housed with another
inmate.

Id.
Glick's claims in counts 3 and 5 have an arguable basis

in law and fact, and, thus, are not frivolous.

The eighth

amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment is
violated when prison officials demonstrate "deliberate
indifference to [the] serious medical needs" of patients.
Estelle v. Gamble. 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).

Psychological

disorders may constitute "serious medical needs."

White v.

Farrier. 849 F.2d 322, 325 (8th Cir. 1988); Meriwether v.
Faulkner. 821 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir.), cert, denied. 484 U.S.
935 (1987); Bowrino v. Godwin. 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977).
£££ Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers of Houston. 791 F.2d
1182, 1187 (5th Cir. 1986); Inmates of Alleaanv County Jail v.
Pierce. 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979).

Because post-traumatic

stress disorder arguably is a psychological disorder that may
rise to the level of a "serious medical need," and because
summary refusal of requests allegedly made to accommodate this
disorder arguably constitute "deliberate indifference," Glick's
claims in counts 3 and 5 are net frivolous and may not be

dismissed under S 1915(d).*
Click's objections to the dismissal of count 8 of the
Amended Complaint are, like the count itself, vague and
con elusory.

Count 8 alleges that Click was subjected to

additional punishment not imposed by Lee Hulet at the Iron County
disciplinary proceeding.

Am. Compl. at 4-5.

Click alleges that,

subsequent to the disciplinary proceeding, his facility privilege
level was reduced, which resulted in the imposition of an earlier
lockdovn time than he had previously enjoyed prior to the
disciplinary proceeding, for a period of 90 days after the
expiration of the ten-day punitive lockdovn to which he was
sentenced,

id.

To the extent that count 8 is based on a denial of
equal protection, that argument was dealt with elsewhere in this
Memorandum Decision and Order.

To the extent that the count is

based on the eighth amendment, a period of graduated early
lockdovn imposed following a violation of a disciplinary rule
does not constitute an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.
4

In so stating, the court makes no finding en whether
post-traumatic stress disorder is in fact a serious medical need,
whether Glick indeed suffers from such disorder, or whether
single-cell occupancy is necessary to accommodate such disorder.
All the court is stating is that counts 3 and 5 may not be
dismissed as frivolous at this stage of the proceedings.
14

See Whitlev v. Alters. 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).

Therefore,

count 8 is dismissed.
Finally, Glick objects to the dismissal of count 9 of
the Amended Complaint.

In that count, Glick alleges he was

denied his eighth amendment rights when forced to endure
humiliating remarks made by Gunter during a strip search.
Compl. at 5.

Am.

Glick alleges officer Gary Gunter and two

unidentified officers conducted a strip search of Glick and that,
during the search, Gunter allegedly stated to Glick, "Let's see
what God made for you."

id.

Gunter than allegedly instructed

Glick to lift his scrotum, and stated, "Bend over and spread em.M

The statements objected to by Glick, though perhaps
unprofessional, do not amount in this case to a violation of the
eighth amendment.

Count 9 is therefore dismissed.

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

This court affirms the Report and Recommendation

of Magistrate Judge Alba dated March 30, 1993 as to counts 1, 2,
6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 and those counts of Click's Amended Complaint
are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1915(d).
2.

This court also affirms the Report and
15

Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Alba dated March 30, 1993, as
to count 4, which is not dismissed at this time.
3.

This court does not adopt the Report and

Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Alba dated March 30, 1993, as
to counts 3 and 5.

Counts 3 and 5 are not dismissed at this

time.
4.

The Clerk of the Court is to issue and serve

process pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 5 1915(c) and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(c) (B)(i).

Defendants need only respond to counts 3,

'•"*''

to &
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Dated this

^

day of May, 1993.

David K. Winder
United States District Judge
Mailed a copy of the foregoing to the following named
counsel this

/ff-

day of May, 1993.

Dennis P. Glide
I.C./U.S.C.P. # 5592/21016
Iron County
Utah State Correctional Facility
2136 North Main Street
Cedar City, Utah 84720
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Alan R. Andersen (A3912)
Bentley J. Tolk (A6665)
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE
185 South State Street, Suite BOO
P. O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Telephone: 532-7840
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
DENNIS P. GLICK,
Petitioner,
v.

]
)
1
]

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

M. TAMARA HOLDEN, Warden,
I

Case No. 920901737 HC

l

Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

Respondent

On September 27,1993, Dennis P. Glick's ("GlickY) Motion for Summary Judgment and
M. Tamara Holden's ("Holden's") Motion for Summary Judgment came before this Court
Appearing for Holden was James H. Beadles, Assistant Attorney General. Alan R. Andersen
appeared on behalf of Glick. After reviewing the submissions of the parties and hearing oral
argument, the Court hereby orders that Glick's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and
that Holden's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
As the basis for its ruling, the Court finds that under the Interstate Corrections Compact
(the "Compact"), Utah officials must act solely as agents for Arkansas with respect to all legal

rights, hearings, and proceedings relating to Glick. Utah Code Ann. § 77-28a-l, Art IV(e),(f),(h)
(1990). The Court also finds that the Compact requires that Glick have all of the legalrightshe
would have if still incarcerated in Arkansas, and that Arkansas law should apply in any bearings
or proceedings relating to him.

gge Gibson v. Morris, 646 P*2d 733, 735 (Utah 1982).

Furthermore, the reference in the Compact to Glick's "legal rights" includes Arkansas prison
policies and procedures promulgated pursuant to Arkansas law.
Accordingly, the Court orders nunc pro tunc the following:
1.

Glick's Utah security classification shall be equivalent in terms of job eligibility,

custody level, security level, inmate association, housing, and all other aspects to his most recent
security classification in Arkansas.
2.

Glick's visitation rights shall be equivalent to those applicable to inmates confined

in Arkansas, including but not limited to therightto have no sex-based distinctions apply to Glick's
permitted visitors.
3.

Glick's hair, beard, and mustache rights in Utah shall be equivalent to those

applicable to inmates confined in Arkansas.
4-

The Utah Department of Corrections (the "Department") shall send to Arkansas the

complete record of each of Glick's disciplinary or other hearings already held in Utah, with the
request that within thirty days Arkansas officials make thefinaldetermination as to whether or how
such information should be reflected in Glick's prison record and progress reports to Arkansas.
5.

If the Department is unable or unwilling to produce complete transcripts of Glick's

past hearings, it may either rehear such matters and send transcripts thereof to Arkansas, or simply

not reflect the alleged disciplinary or other infractions in Glick's prison record or progress reports
sent to Arkansas.
6.

For any present or future disciplinary or other hearings affecting Glick's status,

privileges, or record in any way, the Department shall either contact Arkansas officials in advance
with regard to bow to proceed, or hold a hearing according to Utah procedures, then send the
transcript to Arkansas for a final determination as provided above.
7.

If the Department is unwilling to: (a) follow the determination of Arkansas officials

with respect to any matter referenced above; or (b) exclude from Glick's prison record and
progress reports any alleged infractions for which the Department no longer has transcripts and
has failed to hold new hearings and submit the results thereof to Arkansas, this Court upon
petition of the Department shall hold further hearings to resolve the issue.
8.

Although Arkansas remains free to transfer Glick back to Arkansas, and the State

of Utah remains free to terminate or change the conditions of its contract with Arkansas, the
Department shall not cause or allow Glick to suffer any retaliation, retribution, punishment, or
other adverse effects relating to the terms and conditions of his confinement in Utah as a result
of this action or Order.
Judgment is hereby entered on behalf of Glick and against Holden.

ENTERED this

2Z*-~4*v of September, 1993.

J&/&

Kenneth'Rigtrup
District Court Judge

R E COPK
ORIGINAL

ftU* DISTRICT COURT
Thiro Judictel District

JAMES H. BEADLES (5250)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondents
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 575-1600
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

DENNIS P. GLICK,
Petitioner,

ORDER GRANTING STAY
PENDING APPEAL

v.
M. TAMARA HOLDEN,
Respondent.

Case Ho. 920901737 HC
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

On November 22, 1993, this Court convened a hearing to
consider respondent's motion to vacate the court's earlier ruling
granting petitioner's motion-for summary judgment and petition for
extraordinary relief pursuant to Rule €5B, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Petitioner was represented by appointed counsel, Alan

Andersen and Bentley Tolk; respondent was represented by James H.
Beadles, Assistant Attorney General.
Based on the relevant pleadings and the arguments of counsel,
this Court denied respondent's motion to vacate. At the conclusion
of the hearing, this Court sioned an order orantino BeritiAner'e

motion for summary

judgment

and his request

for relief and

respondent renewed his request for a stay pending appeal. Pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § ;77-28a-l
Interstate

Corrections

(1992)

Compact),

this

(Article IV
Court

stays

[e] of the
its order

granting petitioner's motion for summary judgment and request for
relief, dated November 22, 1993, pending appeal.

2

CERTIFICATE OF PERSONAL DELIVERY
I certify that on the Irk

day of December 1993, I caused to

be personally delivered, the original and one true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING STAY PENDING APPEAL to:
Alan Andersen
Kimball Parr Crockett & Waddoups
185 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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COWTRACT BETWEEN
THE STATE Of UTAH AND THE STATE Of Arkansas
FOR THE IMPIEHENTATION Of THE
INTERSTATE CORRECTIONS COMPACT

In consideration of the cooperative relationship herewith
undertaken in the confinement* care* treatment* 9nd rehabilitation of
inmates on Mr\ interstate basis and in further consideration of services
to be performed and benefits to be derived by each of the parties hereto
in the strengthening of their respective correctional programs, the undersigned states of Utah and

Arkansas

acting by their duly constituted

authorities, and pursuant to and to implement the Interstate Corrections
Compact enacted by each of the parties as follows:
UTAH

Laws of Utah* 1977
Chapter 235 (Effective 5-10-77)

Arkansas

Act 315* 1073
Ark. ftSt. Ann. 46-1401
at. aeq. (Supp. 1977)
do hereby covenant Bn4 agree as follows:
I. INTERSTATE CORRECTIONS COHPACT
The provisions of the Interstate Corrections Compact are hereby
made an integral part of this contract mnA no provision of this contract shall.
be construed in any manner inconsistent with said Compact.
1.

GOVERNING LAV
Except whore expressly otherwise provided* the laws and admin-

istrative regulations and rules of the sanding state shall govern in eny matter
relating to an inmate confined pursuant to this contract mt^A the Interstete
Corrections Compact.
J. TERHIttOlOCV
All terms defined In the Interstate Corrections Compact %ni used
in this contract shall have the same meaning in this contract as in said Compact*
The terms "sending state" and "receiving state91 shall be construed to include
and refer to the appropriate official or ageney thereof in each particular
case.

4. DURATION
This contract shall enter into full force and effect on
and shall be automatically r*n**t4

March 1. 1978

unless

terminated as provided in paragraph five (5) below.
5. TERMINATION
This agreement may be t*rmir*t*6

by notice of either party.

That termination shall become effective ninety (90) days after receipt of
said notice. within a reasonable time of receipt of said notice, the sending
state shall accept delivery of Its inmates at the institution designated by
the receiving state.
6. OTHER ARRANGEMENTS UNAffECTEO
nothing contained in this contract shall be construed to abrogate
or Impair any agreement or contract for the confinement, rehabilitation or
treatment of inmates now In effect between the parties to this contract.
7. HAIL1HC ADDRESSES
All notices* reports, 9n6 correspondence to the respective states
to this contract shall be sent to the following:
UTAH

A1SUBAS

UTAH STATE MISON
BOX 250
DRAPER, UTAH 8*020
Assistant Director of Institution*
T. 0. Bos §707
tine U u f X , Arfcaneaa 7161X

8. EIGHT OF INSPECTION
The sending stete shall have the right to inspect, at all
reasonable

times, any Institution of the receiving state in winch inmates of

the sending state ore confined In order to determine If that Institution main*
tains standards of care and discipline not Incompatible with those of the
tending state %nd that all Inmates wherein are treated equitably, regardless
of race", color, religion, creed or national origin.
••

VACANCIES
The receiving stete hereby undertakes to make available to the

tending state such places for inmates as aujy be vacant from time to time in
eny and all institutions of the receiving state made available for such confinement fry the laws of the receiving state.

• 3

10. APPLICATION
The sending state will submit a separate application to the
receiving state for each individual inmate proposed for commitment.
Said application shall consist of the following: Full information and all necessary documents relating to the case history, physical
and clinical record, judicial and administrative rulings Bnd orders relating
or pertinent to the inmate ^nd the sentence or sentences pursuant to which
confinement is to be had or to continue, and reasons for the requested transfer.
Commitment will be deferred until approved by the receiving
state.
11. DELIVERY OF IWKATE
Upon receipt of the acceptance of the application the sending
State at its expense will deliver the inmate to the institution in the receiving
State designated by the receiving state, together with the original or a duly
authenticated copy of his commitment, %nd any other official papers or documents
authorising detention. Whenever there is to be a mutual exchange of inmates
between the parties to this contract, the authorities of one of the states may
act as the agent of the other state for purposes of transferring its inmates
so that the expenses to both atetes may be minimised.
12. TRANSFER Of TUMPS
Funds 4\tt transferred Inmates shall be provided by the sending
state to be credited to the account of the transferred inmate in the receiving
state. Upon the r%tum

of the inmate'to the sending state, the receiving state

shall provide funds in the amount due the inmate at the time of return or release
13. *SSP0HS1BIUTY FOR OFFENDERS CUSTODY
It shall be the responsibility of the administration of the
institution In the receiving ftate to confine inmates from e sending state; to
five them care and treatment including the furnishing the subsistence and all
necessary medical *n6 hospital services Bn€ supplies; to provide for their
physical needs; to make available to them the programs of training tnd treatment
which ere consistent with their individual needs; to retain them in safe custody;

- i» -

that they receive no special privileges *n4 that the sentences and orders
of the committing court in the sending state %rt faithfully executed. But
nothing herein contained shall be construed to require the receiving state
or any of its Institutions to provide treatment, facilities or programs for
any Inmate confined pursuant to the Interstate Corrections Compact which it
does not provide for similar Inmates not confined pursuant to said Compact.
I*. HtPlCAL SCEV1CES
(a) Inmates from the sending state shall receive such medical,
psychiatric and dental treatment at may be necessary to safeguard their health
Bn6 promote their adjustment es self-supporting members of the community upon
release. Unless en emergency Is Involved, the receiving state shatl contact
the sending state for advance authority in writing before incurring medical,
psychiatric, or dental expense for which the sending state is responsible under
the terms of this contract.

In any emergency, the receiving sttte may proceed

with the necessary treatment without prior authority, but In every such case the
receiving state shall notify the sending stete immediately %nd furnish full In*
formation regarding the nature of the illness, the type of treatment to be pro*
vlded %nd the estimated cost thereof.
(fe) When medical, psychiatric or dental care of treatment re*
quires the removal of the inmate from the Institution, the inmate shall be removed only after notification to the sending state.

In the event of Mn emergency

which does not permit prior notification, the institutions shall notify the
sending state as promptly thereafter as practicable. All necessary precautions
shall be taken to assure the $&U^kM9pln% of the inmate while he is absent from
the normal place of confinement., necessary custodial supervision shall be pro*
vlded by the receiving state.
(c) Any costs of medical, psychiatric or dental service shall
be considered normal costs Incidental to the operation of the institution In
the receiving e u t e If the service is rmndtr%6 by, steff personnel Bnd In regular
maintained facilities operated or utlUted by the institution as part of the
health or correctional program thereof end If the inmate requires no special
medication, drugs, equipment, anesthetics, surgery or nursing care in addition
to that commonly available on an Infirmary basts. The cost of any special

• sservices, medication, equipment, surgical, or nursing care shall be chargeable
to the sending state.
15.

TRAINING 0* EMPLOYMENT
(a)

inmates from the sending state shall be afforded the

opportunity and shall be required to participate in programs of occupational
training and industrial or other work on the same basis as inmates of the
receiving state. Compensation in connection with any such participation
(whether as payment. Incentive, or for any other therapeutic or rehabilitative
reason) shall be paid to inmates of the sending state on the same basis as to
inmates of the receiving state. Any such inmates of the sending state shall
be subject to the regular work discipline imposed upon other inmate participants
in the particular program.

However, nothing contained herein shall be con*

strued to permit or require any inmate of a sending state to participate in
training, industrial or other work program contrary to the laws of the sending
state.
(b) The receiving state shall have the right to dispose of all
products produced by an inmate, shall retain all proceeds therefrom, and shall
bear all costs of said program.
(c)

In the ease of Handicraft or Hobbyeraft programs, the Inmates

shall h%v the right to dispose of the products of his labor mn6 retain the
proceeds of any sale of his work in accordance with the rules of the receiving
state.
16*. DISCIPLINE
The receiving state, as agent for the sending state, shall have
physical control over ^na power to exercise disciplinary authority over all
inmates from tending states. However, nothing contained herein shall be construed to authorfie or permit the imposition of a type of discipline prohibited
by the laws of the sanding state.
17.

IAVS M P HE6ULATI0KS
Inmates while in the custody of the receiving state shall be

subject to all the provisions of law and regulations applicable to persons
committed for violations of law of the receiving state not inconsistent with

• 6 18.

RECORDS AND REPORTS TROM RECEIVING STATE
(a) Within ninety (90) days following the receipt of an

inmate from the sending state, the receiving state shall furnish an admission
classification report outlining the Inmate's social background, medical,
psychiatric, education and vocational findings and Indicating the institutional
program which has been recommended..

Thereafter, preferably at intervals of

six months, but at least annually, the receiving state shall furnish the
sending state a report giving a summary of the inmate's progress and adjustment
since the last report, including a recommendation for retention or return. All
such reports shall be forwarded to the sending state.
(b) The superintendent or other administrative head of an
institution, in which inmates from sending states Mrt confined, shall keep all
necessary and pertinent records concerning such inmates in a manner agreed
between the sending and receiving states. During the inmate's continuance in
the institution, the sending state shall be entitled to receive, and upon
request shall be furnished with copies of any such record or records.

Upon

termination of confinement in the institution, the sending state shall receive
the complete file of the inmate. Sut nothing herein contained shell be con*
strued to prevent the receiving state or any institution thereof from keeping cop
of any such record or records upon mr^ after termination of confinement.
19.

KEMOVAL THOU INSTITUTION
An inmate from the sending stete legally confined in the

Institutions of the receiving state shall not be removed therefrom by any person
without an order from the sending state, this subdivision shall not apply to an
emergency necessitating the Immediate removal of the Inmate for medical, dental
or psychiatric treatment or other catastrophe or condition presenting imminent
danger to the safety of the inmate.

In the case of any removal for such en

emergency cause, the receiving state shall Inform the sending stete of the
whereabouts of the Inmate or inmates so removed at the earliest practicable
time, Bn6 shall exercise all reasonable care for the safekeeping and custody of
such Inmate or Inmates.
20.

HEARINGS

—
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- 7 any heoring by authorities of the sending state, to which Mn in.»«te nay be
entitled by the laws of the sending state. Upon the reQuest of the sending
state, the authorities of the receiving state will be authorized to and will
condoct any such hearings, prepare end submit the record of said hearings,
together with any recommendations of the hearing officials, to the officer or
offictrt

of the sending state before whom the hearing would hovt been hid. if

it h4d taken place In the sending state.
21.

IHTER-INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFERS
Notwithstanding any provision herein to the contrary, the

receiving state may tr^ntftr

an Inmate from one institution under its control

to another whenever it deems Such action MppropriBtt.

Notice of such transfer

shall Immediately be sent to the sending state.
22. ESCAPE
In case any such inmate shall escape from custody in the receiving
state, that receiving state will use all reasonable means to recapture the inmate
The escape shall be reported immediately to the sending state. The receiving
stete shall have the primary responsibility for and authority to direct the pursu
and retaking of the Inmate within Its own territory. Any costs in connection
therewith shall be chargeable to and borne by the receiving state.
23-

DEATH OF 1MKATE
(a) In the event of the death of an inmate from a sending state,

the medical examiner, coroner or other official having the duties of such an
officer In the jurisdiction shall be notified. The sending state shall receive
copies of any records made at or in connection with such notification.
(b) The Institution in the receiving state shall immediately
notify the tending state of the death of an Inmate, furnish Information as
requested, and follow the Instructions of the sending state with regard to the
disposition of the body. The body shall not be released except on order of the
eppropriete officials of the sending state. All expenses relative to any
necessary preparation of the body and shipment or express charges shall be paid
by the sending state. The sending mnd receiving states may arrange to have the
receiving state take **rm of the burial 9n4 alt matters related or incidental
thereto 9n6 ell such expenses shall be paid by the sendino state. The provision

8
states and shall not affect the liability of any relative or other person for
the disposition of the deceased or for any expenses connected therewith.
(c) The sending state shall receive a certified copy of the
death certificate for any of its inmates who have 4tc6 while in the receiving
state.
24.

GRATUITIES AND EXPENSES ATTENDANT UPON RELEASE
The provision of clothing gratuities and any other supplies

upon release of an inmate shall be at the expense of the sending state and shall
be in accordance with its laws.
25.

RETAKING OF IHKATES
The receiving state will deliver any of said imattes to the

proper officials of the sending state upon demand made to the receiving state
and presentation of official written authority to receive said inmates.
The sending state will retake any inmate, upon the request of
the receiving state, within thirty (30) days after receipt of the request to
retake.
In case

the commitment under.which any of said inmates is

terminated for any reason, the fending state agrees to accept delivery of the
prisoner at the institution of the receiving state, mn6 at its expense return
him to the jurisdiction of the sending state.
26.

PHOTOGRAPHING AND PUBLICITY
Institutional or other officials of the receiving state shall not

be authorised to release publicity concerning inmates from the sending state.
They shall mot release personal histories or photographs of such inmates or
Information concerning their arrival or departure or permit reporters or
photographers to interview or photograph such Inmates. Requests for information
regarding inmates of sanding states shall be referred to the sending state.
However, information of public record, such as sentence data or information
concerning the escape of an inmate may be given directly to the press by the
receiving state. The receiving state may photograph inmates from the sending
state as a mean* of identification for official use only.
27.

COST AMD REIMBURSEMENT
In addition to cost and reimbursement required by other provisions

- 9provisions of this contract, the sending state Shalt pay to the receiving
state for the custody, treatment and rehabilitation of each transferred innvate
a sum equal to tne individual institution daily cost which is the total of the
previous fiscal year's operating expense of the institution divided by the
average daily population of the institution Mnd reduced to a daily cost, except
that there shall be no reimbursement if there is an equal exchange of prisoners
between the contracting states, for the duration of the period of exchange.
The sending state shall be billed quarterly for the cost.
28-

TRANSPORTATION
Any and all costs of transportation incurred prior to admission

to an institution in the receiving state, and transportation at the time of, or
as an incident to release or discharge, conditional or otherwise, shall be
charged to sending state.
29.

811UHC AND PAYMENT
The receiving state will bill the sending state quarterly and

reimbursement will be made as soon after the receipt of billing as the various
stata agencies ere able to process the claim.
30.

RESPONSIBILITIES FOR U 6 A L PROCEEDINGS
The sending state undertakes to defend any action or proceeding

involving the custody of any of its Inmates. The receiving state shall be reimbun
for any expense It may incur in connection

therewith.

The receiving state

agrees to ^tfmn^ any action or proceeding erising out of confinement in the
receiving state or involving employees of the receiving state.
Jl.

INTERNAL RELATIONS
nothing in this contract shall be construed to affect the

internal relationships between or among the party states and their subdivisions.
officers, department or agencies, but each party state undertakes %n6 acknowledges
1 lability and responsibility for making aach other perty stete whole in respect
of any obligation imposed upon It by or pursuant to this contract.

- 10 (N WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned duly authorized officers h«ve
subscribed their names on behalf of the State of Utah and the State of
Arkansas

STATE OF UTAH
UTAH STATE W'VISION OF CORRECTIONS

William V. Hi I liken, 0freetor

STATE OF ARKANSAS
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION

«tmiKtbry, 01 rector V

Contract between the Utah State Department of Social Services,
and

Corrections
State of' Arkansas

Contract Term; ' 3/1/78 - Temlnation

Contract #_

APPROVED:
Department of S o d a ! Services
A. W. Mitchell. Ph.D;, Exec. Dir.

Date

&/£?/?f

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
Robert^BT^ansen, Attorney General
Date

APPROVED AS TO AVAILABILITY OF FUilDS":

WaJM*
£^&**r->v.
^
%'?-•?>r
Budget Officer
APPROVED:

MEMORANDUM:
JO:

3/22/78

CORKECTIONS

SUBJECT: Approved Contract

State Contract No.

78 B73S

Enclosed ere two copies of the above numbered contract between your aoency end
State of Arkansas
Please retain one copy of this contract for your files and forward one copy to the
other party to the contract

Metvtn Jt£ Owens, Director
Administrative Services
MMO/AEA
End oi

^

Social Services>v - -—-^'M;-

Scott M. Matht»n f Governor, State of Utth
Anthony W. Mitchell. PhD.. £»cutivt Director

" IMS I 1978$)
MEMORANDUM
TO:

^ ^ r S ^ .

0

"

^

DATE:

2/23/78

Anthony W. Mitchell, Ph.D., Executive Director

W.
FROM^/X^Melvin M.=OwensTDirector,
Administrative Services
SUBJECT: CONTRACT • Transmittal and Summary

^

WAR 03 137j
„,„..,.

WflECTOfl OF FINANCE

Enclosed for your approval and transmittal to the Attorney General and State
Finance Department, are
3
copies of a contract as described below:
SUMMARY
RECEIVED OAS

1121121.

STATE FINANCE #

73"8735

DATE

Contract Principals:

Corrective
State of Arkansas
B New Contract
O Renewal
D Amendment *
Contract Period:
?A
1078 *n
Termination
Contract Amount: S A« « » ^

Department Stiff Reviews
A Comments:

PURPOSE:

107

Bureau of Fiannc
Contract rwwr

giss-^^

Interstate Corrections Compact

«AR 1 h978
«•!/•> XAJmmt U A M * t T M M k

ClttftA *

